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WHAT LEGAL SCHOLARS CAN LEARN FROM LAW AND
ECONOMICS
ANTHONY OGUS*
It is a general, and in my opinion deplorable, characteristic of legal
scholarship that normative analysis vastly preponderates over
positive.
-Richard A. Posner,
INTRODUCTION
The task I have set myself in this Article is to offer some general
observations on how legal scholars can benefit from law and econom-
ics.2 Most lawyers who are aware of the subdiscipline- and there are
an increasing number of these-tend to identify it with propositions
like, "judges or the legislature ought to adopt rule X in situation Y
because it is the efficient solution to the problem." Such propositions
are, of course, conclusions to normative analysis and, as such, are
vulnerable to criticism which was already familiar twenty years ago
and which has never been refuted: the law reflects values and goals
other than that of allocative efficiency.3 This does not imply that the
analysis is misguided or unimportant, since awareness of what is an
efficient legal rule in any given situation can contribute much to legal
policymaking; at the minimum, policymakers who pursue noneffi-
ciency goals should be made aware of the welfare costs of doing so.
* Professor of Law, University of Manchester; Research Professor, University of Maas-
tricht. I am grateful for comments on this Article made by Judge Richard Posner and partici-
pants at the Special Workshop on Law and Economics and Legal Scholarship, 21st IVR World
Congress, Lund, Sweden (August 12-18, 2003).
1. Richard A. Posner, The Economic Approach to Law, 53 TEX. L. REV. 757, 768 (1975).
2. It is a companion to, but very different from, my contribution to the New Palgrave
Dictionary, Anthony I. Ogus, Law-and-Economics From the Perspective of Law, in 2 THE NEW
PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 486 (Peter Newman ed., 1998), which
adopted a largely chronological approach.
3. Ronald Dworkin, Why Efficiency?: A Reply to Professors Calabresi and Posner, 8
HOFSTRA L. REV. 563 (1980); Guido Calabresi, The New Economic Analysis of Law: Scholar-
ship, Sophistry, or Self-Indulgence?, 68 PROC. BRIT. ACAD. 85 (1982). I am unconvinced by the
recent attempt in LOUIS KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE (2002), to
discount notions of fairness by arguing that they are simply part of the social welfare function.
See Daniel A. Farber, What (If Anything) Can Economics Say About Equity?, 101 MICH. L.
REV. 1791 (2003) (reviewing KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra).
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But obsession with the efficiency goal4 has tended to divert attention
away from the power and insights of positive analysis.
The quotation which heads this Article comes from a paper writ-
ten by Posner in 1975, in which he argues that the economic analysis
of law can and should serve as a corrective "increasing our knowledge
about the legal system."5 The observation leads to a double irony:
first, that most of the law and economics literature appears to have
been normative in character; and second, that Posner's own work has
been a primary inspiration for it. Both aspects can be explained by
the ambiguity as to what is meant by "positive" law and economics
analysis.6 Drawing on the conventional understanding of the term
within economics, 7 1 construe it to mean the application of economic
methodology to predict the impact of law and legal institutions on
behavior. 8 I argue in Section I that, in this sense, Posner's observa-
tion-that the positive, predictive contribution of law and economics
is still undervalued-is still justified, and that lawyers, because so of-
ten they fail to understand the nature of the interaction between law
and market phenomena, can derive much insight from it.
Others, including Posner himself,9 have sometimes given a spe-
cial meaning to "positive law and economics": a prediction that the
law has an economic function and, in particular, that the common law
serves as an "instrument for promoting economic efficiency."10 It is
confusing to incorporate within the framework of positive analysis a
normative concept-"efficiency"-especially when there is no agree-
ment on the criterion as to what is "efficient"; and empirical verifica-
tion of the predictive hypothesis is necessarily problematic." For this
reason it may be preferable to refer to this type of analysis as "inter-
4. Or rather goals, since in only a minority of law and economics publications is it made
clear whether the author is using the Pareto or Kaldor-Hicks criterion for efficiency.
5. Posner, supra note 1, at 768.
6. See Paul Burrows & Cento G. Veljanovski, Introduction: The Economic Approach to
Law, in THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO LAW 17-21 (Paul Burrows & Cento G. Veljanovski
eds., 1981).
7. MILTON FRIEDMAN, ESSAYS IN POSITIVE ECONOMICS 4 (1953).
8. See Michael Trebilcock, The Value and Limits of Law and Economics, in THE SECOND
WAVE OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 12-17 (Megan Richardson & Gillian Hadfield eds., 1999).
9. Richard A. Posner, Some Uses and Abuses of Economics in Law, 46 U. CHI. L. REV.
281, 287-97 (1979); and see, for example, the title to the paper, William M. Landes & Richard
A. Posner, The Positive Economic Theory of Tort Law, 15 GA. L. REV. 851 (1981).
10. Posner, Some Uses and Abuses of Economics in Law, supra note 9, at 289-90.
11. Burrows & Veljanovski, supra note 6, at 19.
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pretive" or "explanatory.' 12 Whatever it is called, this type of analysis
has clearly made a major contribution to modes of legal scholarship
which center on promoting the coherence and systematic orderliness
of the law. As I shall attempt to demonstrate in Section II, because
law and economics cuts across traditional legal conceptual structures
as well as legal systems and cultures, it provides a valuable tool for
understanding the relationship between different parts of the legal
system and between different systems. More controversially, I shall
also contend that an economic interpretation helps to resolve the am-
biguities and uncertainties that inevitably arise when legal entitle-
ments are based on notions of morality and corrective justice.
I. POSITIVE LAW AND ECONOMICS
A. Behavioral Incentives
Much of the law creates obligations for actors (individuals or
firms) to behave, or not to behave, in certain ways. The obligations
form part of a large variety of regimes, each with its own set of sanc-
tions which are expected to induce the desired outcome. Supposing
that a policymaker is concerned with ascertaining what regime or
regimes would be preferable to achieve a given behavioral outcome,
positive law and economics can provide a major input. It does so by
treating all the regimes as pricing mechanisms, adding to the cost of
an activity and thereby reducing the demand for it. Then, to compare
the impact on behavior of the different mechanisms, it adopts a pre-
dictive model, for example that the actor will comply when
U<qE+pD
U being the utility the actor derives from noncompliance; qE repre-
senting the probability and the associated costs of the relevant act
being detected by an enforcement agent; and pD being the probabil-
ity of a formal condemnation or conviction and its associated costs,
including notably the prescribed sanction. 3 In relation to the possible
12. I prefer these designations to the more frequently encountered "descriptive law and
economics." Cf. FRANK H. STEPHEN, THE ECONOMICS OF THE LAW 3-5 (1988).
13. The model distinguishes between the costs resulting from detection and formal con-
demnation respectively, because in many regimes optimal enforcement strategy implies that the
latter stage should not be reached. P. Fenn & C.G. Veljanovski, A Positive Economic Theory of
Regulatory Enforcement, 98 ECON. J. 1055 (1988).
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regimes available, the policymaker will then wish to explore four
principal variables: the administrative costs of enforcement (distin-
guishing between the costs of any process and those of imposing the
sanction); the attributes of the sanction (how likely it is to satisfy the
condition pD > U); the incidence of informal costs (qE, which may
compensate for any deficit in pD); and the level of information avail-
able to actors regarding qE + pD, since without such information the
model is inoperative.
I have attempted in the following table to summarize how the
variables are likely to operate in relation to the different sanction
regimes.
Process Imposition Adequate Informal Actors'
costs costs sanction costs add- inform-
on ation
Fine
Prison
Community
Confiscation
Tort damages
Punitive
damages
Injunction
Restitution
Contractual
invalidity
Administrative
penalty
Tax/charge
Market
exclusion
Name and
shame
Social norm
high
high
high
medium
mediuma
high
low
high
high
low
medium
medium
high high/
medium'
medium
medium
generally
generally
sometimes
sometimes
sometimes
generally
generally
generally
generally
generally
sometimes
generally
generally sometimes medium
low rarely
low some-
times'
medium generally
medium sometimes
low generally
medium low
rarely
rarely
rarely
rarely
generally
sometimes always
sometimes always
medium
medium
medium
medium
medium
low
medium
low
medium
high
low
medium
high
"Includes settlement of claims.
b Medium if there is negotiated release.
c When there is significant investment in the transaction.
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Of course, the level of generality in the classifications, as well as
the subjectivity involved in the judgments, reduces their usefulness.
But if they were to be applied to identify the system which may be
presumed to achieve the desired behavioral inducement at lowest
cost, then combining a low score in the second and third columns with
a high score in the remaining three columns would provide some an-
swer.
The methodology involved in this analysis is, of course, highly
familiar from the economics of crime and law enforcement litera-
ture,'14 although its application to some of the regimes involved in the
comparison may be more original. Why should it be of value to law-
yers? We should note, in the first place, that in thinking about deter-
rence, lawyers certainly pay heed to the level of sanctions and the
problems of inadequate enforcement, but nevertheless often fail to
recognize the interplay between the two variables which lies at the
heart of the economic model. So also, there is a tendency to focus
excessively on the criminal law, thereby overlooking, or at least un-
dervaluing, the incentive effects generated by other legal instruments.
The neglect is unfortunate because, in terms of administrative costs,
the criminal justice process is particularly expensive.15
A second, and related, point is that lawyers typically give insuffi-
cient attention to "informal costs" (E). Social norms constitute one
important source of these informal costs. 16 It is difficult to generalize
on the size of the costs since so much depends on the character and
context of the norm. The probability of incurring disapproval conse-
quent on contravention of the norm will also vary enormously, but
since there are likely to be more individuals interested in observing
compliance with social norms than those directly involved in the en-
14. See A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Public Enforcement of Law, in 5
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS: THE ECONOMICS OF CRIME AND LITGATION 307
(Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit De Geest eds., 2000) (hereinafter ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW
AND ECONOMICS); Erling Eide, Economics of Criminal Behavior, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW
AND ECONOMICS, supra, at 345.
15. This is a consequence of the higher level of procedural protection afforded to defen-
dants. For an economic analysis of the justification for this higher level of protection, see Rich-
ard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial Administration, 2 J.
LEGAL STUD. 399, 410-17 (1973); and, for another interpretation, see Keith N. Hylton & Vik-
ramaditya S. Khanna, Toward an Economic Theory of Pro-Defendant Criminal Procedure
(Boston Univ. Sch. of Law, Law & Econ. Working Paper No. 01-02, 2001), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf?abstract id=265795.
16. See generally Symposium, Social Norms, Social Meaning, and the Economic Analysis of
Law, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 537 (1998); and, for a comparison with legal norms, Steven Shavell,
Law Versus Morality as Regulators of Conduct, 6 AM. J.L. & ECON. (forthcoming).
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forcement of legal rules, we can perhaps attribute a higher value to p
in the former case. In any event, the costs of enforcement are signifi-
cantly lower, since by definition no formal proceedings are involved.
To counter such advantages, it should be noted that a significant de-
gree of uncertainty typically exists as to the content of the social or
moral norms, thus creating ambiguity regarding their application to
specific situations.
Informal costs may also be consequent upon condemnation by,
or involvement in, formal legal processes. These may be characterized
either as stigma costs, where the publicity consequent on the finding
affects primarily the social reputation of the actor; or as market costs,
if commercial reputation is damaged and demand for the actor's
products or services is reduced. The former depends critically, of
course, on the social standing and network of the individual con-
cerned. Commercial reputation plays a key role in certain industrial
sectors, particularly if traders have an interest in maintaining an
ongoing relationship with customers and thereby acquiring their
goodwill.17 In consequence, informal costs may, in some contexts at
least, be more important than formal costs. 18
B. The Ex Ante, Ex Post Dilemma
Much of the practice of law involves some form of dispute reso-
lution and of course, particularly in a common law system, judicial
rulings play a significant part in the interpretation and development
of the law. I do not wish here to enter into the classic debate about
the impact of levels of generality or specificity in legal rules and
therefore also of the degree of discretion conferred on adjudicators."
But one aspect deserves attention in the present context: adjudica-
tion, for the purpose of determining an appropriate outcome, typi-
cally involves investigating an individual dispute ex post; and the
adversarial approach favored in common law jurisdictions tends to
17. Carl Shapiro, Consumer Information, Product Quality, and Seller Reputation, 13 BELL
J. ECON. 20 (1982).
18. Jonathan M. Karpoff & John R. Lott, Jr., The Reputational Penalty Firms Bear From
Committing Criminal Fraud, 36 J.L. & ECON. 757 (1993).
19. The classic paper is Isaac Ehrlich & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal
Rulemaking, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 257 (1974). For an interesting recent contribution to the litera-
ture, see Katharina Pistor & Cheng-Gang Xu, Incomplete Law-A Conceptual and Analytical
Framework and its Application to the Evolution of Financial Market Regulation (Columbia Law
Sch. Center for Law & Econ. Studies, Working Paper No. 204, 2002), available at
http://ssrn.comlabstractid=310588.
[Vol 79:383
20041 WHAT LEGAL SCHOLARS CAN LEARN FROM LAW AND ECONOMICS 389
force attention away from the generality of the issues involved to the
merits of the opposing claims. In contrast, the economic approach
invariably adopts an ex ante approach, exploring how the generality
of actors respond to given legal rules. As such, it can provide a valu-
able corrective to bias or myopic reasoning that can arise in ex post
decisionmaking. 0
An obvious starting point would be the problem of hindsight
bias: individuals tend to overstate the predictability of events that
have already occurred.21 As such it can obviously lead to flawed deci-
sions regarding causation or the level of care to be expected of ac-
tors.2 By insisting on ex ante risk assessment, law and economics
provides a necessary corrective. The point is straightforward and re-
quires no elaboration. I wish, instead, to move to an independent, but
related problem: when making decisions ex post on the basis of a
principle or interpretation which seems to them to be appropriate to
resolve the individual dispute, judges sometimes fail to appreciate
what impact this is likely to have ex ante, but which an economic
analysis would be adept at predicting.
An example can be taken from insolvency law. Judges and poli-
cymakers have struggled to formulate rules and procedures for bank-
ruptcy which are, on the one hand, "just" to creditors and, on the
other hand, reduce the costs to the various stakeholders involved in
financial distress.23 Critical also, but often ignored in the analysis, is
the impact the arrangements have on corporate behavior ex ante: if
they are too lenient, managers may be encouraged to engage in
suboptimally risky ventures; creditors may demand higher rates of
interest, or be unwilling to lend; and investment patterns may
change.2 4
20. Michael J. Trebilcock, Economic Analysis of Law, in CANADIAN PERSPECTIVES ON
LEGAL THEORY 103-07 (Richard F. Devlin ed., 1991).
21. Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, A Positive Psychological Theory of Judging in Hindsight, in
BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS 95 (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2000).
22. Lawyers might not, of course, respond as "typical" individuals, but I have (sadly) to
report that in a coursework assignment, given as part of my undergraduate law and economics
course, more than a few students exhibited the bias. They were asked to comment on an acci-
dent killing thirty-one people and arising from a decision made by a railway company not to
invest in more sophisticated signaling equipment which, on the evidence accepted by the com-
pany, would have saved one life over a period of twenty years. A number of students seemed to
assume that because the accident had happened, the statistical evidence relied on by the com-
pany had been shown to be unreliable.
23. See, e.g., R.M. GOODE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE INSOLVENCY LAW (2d ed. 1997).
24. Robert K. Rasmussen, The Ex Ante Effects of Bankruptcy Reform on Investment Incen-
tives, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 1159 (1994); Anthony I. Ogus & Charles K. Rowley, Prepayments and
Insolvency (1984) (published by the United Kingdom Office of Fair Trading).
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Take, next, contract law and the English case of Williams v.
Roffey Bros. & Nicholls Ltd.,, A carpenter who had contracted with
builders to undertake certain work for them found that, because of
financial difficulties, he was unable to complete it at the agreed price
and he negotiated an increase. The builders subsequently argued-that
the agreement to pay the increase was not enforceable because it was
not supported by consideration: they had sustained no benefit from
paying more (in economic terms, it was not a Pareto-efficient con-
tract). The court disagreed. By enabling the work to be finished on
time, and without the hassle of enforcing the original contract, the
builders had secured a benefit. Now, whatever be the merits of this
decision (and with reference to the parties themselves, it appears to
have been a good one), the judges failed to ask the question which
would have been at the heart of an economic analysis:26 What incen-
tive effects would the suggested interpretation of principle have on
contracting behavior generally? The evident problem is that, if con-
tract modifications are too readily enforceable, then individuals may
be led to believe that there is little risk in underpricing in order to
attract custom (in which case, though the subsequent modification
may be in the interest of both parties, it is not Pareto efficient, be-
cause of the negative externalities generated).
Appreciation of the likely ex ante impact of a rule or ruling gen-
erally requires some understanding of the market conditions applica-
ble in the situation and the predictable response of actors to them. It
is a well-trodden path for positive law and economics scholars, but
may be less familiar territory for lawyers. Given the foundational
status of Coasean ideas,27 the former are likely to be adept at predict-
ing how parties will find consensual arrangements capable of bypass-
ing the rules or rulings when it is in their mutual interest to do so,
whereas lawyers may attribute a higher normative quality to the pro-
nouncements. 28
25. Williams v. Roffey Bros. & Nicholls (Contractors) Ltd., [1991] 1 Q.B. 1 (C.A. 1989).
26. Cf. Antony W. Dnes, The Law and Economics of Contract Modifications: The Case of
Williams v. Roffey, 15 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 225 (1995).
27. R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
28. An empirical study, Ward Farnsworth, Do Parties to Nuisance Cases Bargain After
Judgment? A Glimpse Inside the Cathedral, in BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS, supra note
21, at 302, 310, has shown that lawyers rarely envisage bargaining around court orders as postu-
lated in Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inaliena-
bility: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972). More familiar, perhaps, is the
device of entering into one category of contractual relationship (e.g., a license) in order to avoid
the regulatory requirements of another (e.g., leasehold). See, e.g., Street v. Mountford, [1985]
A.C. 809 (H.L.).
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Judicial attempts to identify, and then to regulate, "unfair" terms
in a contract illustrate well how a failure to understand market condi-
tions can not only hinder good decisionmaking, but may also lead to
outcomes opposite to those which were intended. In A. Schroeder
Music Publishing Co. v. Macaulay,2 9 a young pop musician had en-
tered into a standard form contract with a publishing house. The con-
tract contained terms highly favorable to the publishers including one
which effectively tied the musician to the publishers for a long period,
if a song was successful. The House of Lords held that the clause was
unenforceable being in unreasonable restraint of trade. At the heart
of the judges' reasoning was the conviction that contracts issued on a
"take-it-or-leave-it" basis were "a classic instance of superior bargain-
ing power" which could be exploited to force unwanted terms on the
other party.30 They were typically "the result of the concentration of
particular kinds of business in relatively few hands."31
Law and economics analysis has exposed the weaknesses in these
traditional arguments.32 The essence of the matter is not whether the
terms of the contract were presented on a "take-it-or-leave-it" basis,
but whether alternatives were available in the market. A standard
form is not, by itself, a reliable indicator of a cartel or undue market
concentration; they are regularly used in many highly competitive
industries. Provided that there is a sufficient number of active con-
sumers who do compare the terms offered by different suppliers and
whose demand the latter will need to attract, the terms should meet
the preferences of consumers as well as suppliers. 3
An investigation of the market conditions in the Schroeder case
would have revealed the existence of adequate competition among
music publishers. 34 It would also have provided an obvious economic
explanation for the apparently onerous terms in the contract: given
the relatively low rate of success of unknown pop composers, pub-
29. A. Schroeder Music Publ'g Co. Ltd. v. Macaulay, [1974] 3 All ER 616 (H.L.).
30. Id. at 624 (Diplock, L.).
31. Id.
32. See, particularly, the studies of M.J. Trebilcock, The Doctrine of Inequality of Bargain-
ing Power: Post-Benthamite Economics in the House of Lords, 26 U. TORONTO L.J. 359 (1976);
M.J. Trebilcock & D.N. Dewees, Judicial Control of Standard Form Contracts, in THE
ECONOMIC APPROACH TO LAW 93, supra note 6; Michael J. Trebilcock, An Economic Ap-
proach to the Doctrine of Unconscionability, in STUDIES IN CONTRACT LAW 379, 390-421
(Barry J. Reiter & John Swan eds., 1980).
33. Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, Intervening in Markets on the Basis of Imperfect
Information: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 630 (1979).
34. Trebilcock & Dewees, Judicial Control of Standard Form Contracts, supra note 32, at
101-02.
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lishers have to derive an increased profit from those who are success-
•ful to cover the costs of publication. Clearly if the attempts to secure
such a profit are rendered unenforceable, publishers will be unable to
publish songs from unknown composers unless they are confident of
success-an outcome which is unlikely to be beneficial to the indi-
viduals whose interests the judicial intervention was intended to pro-
tect.35
C. Comparative Law and Rule Formulation
There has been a revival of interest in comparative law in recent
years, mainly as a consequence of the globalization of markets and
the perception that there are benefits to be obtained from the har-
monization, or at least approximation, between different legal sys-
tems.3 6  Comparative lawyers have been slow to adopt the
methodology of law and economics,37 but there have been important
publications in the last few years.3 8 In my own work, I have explored
the hypothesis that some degree of competition between national
legal orders, arising primarily as a consequence of greater freedom of
international trade and greater freedom in choice of law rules, helps
to explain the relationship between the evolution of legal principles in
different jurisdictions,39 and that "legal culture" is best understood as
an economic network, established by practicing lawyers in order to
create barriers to that competition. 4°
35. For another example, also a House of Lords decision, see George Mitchell (Chesterhall)
Ltd. v. Finney Lock Seeds Ltd., [1983] 2 A.C. 803 (H.L.), and the interesting commentary by
HUGH COLLINS, REGULATING CONTRACTS 273-74 (1999).
In order to reach decisions that conform to sophisticated assessments of substantive
unfairness informed by sociology and economics, legal adjudication has to incorporate
these frameworks of analysis into its reasoning. In so doing, however, the legal analysis
corrupts or misreads those other discourses, so that it misses their full subtlety.
Id.
36. See, e.g., VEREINHEITLICHUNG UND DIVERSITAT DES ZIVILRECHTS IN
TRANSNATIONALEN WIRTSCHAFrSRAUMEN [HARMONIZATION AND DIVERSITY IN CIVIL LAW
FROM A TRANSNATIONAL ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE] (Claus Ott & Hans-Bernd Schdfer eds.,
2002).
37. Perhaps because comparative law has been dominated by European, rather than North
American, scholars.
38. See UGO MATTEI, COMPARATIVE LAW AND ECONOMICS (1997). See also the Global
Jurist electronic journals, http://www.bepress.com/gj/.
39. Anthony Ogus, Competition Between National Legal Systems: A Contribution of Eco-
nomic Analysis to Comparative Law, 48 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 405 (1999).
40. Anthony Ogus, The Economic Basis of Legal Culture: Networks and Monopolization, 22
OxFoRD J. LEGAL STUD. 419 (2002).
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Here I wish to consider how law and economics can contribute to
what is more central to the work of comparative lawyers: an under-
standing and evaluation of differences between the national legal
principles governing identical factual situations. A regular finding of
comparativists is that a given difference is more apparent than real, in
the sense that the same outcome is reached but by a different legal
route. So, for example, if a reader, as a consequence of following neg-
ligent advice regarding investments given in a newspaper, sustained
financial losses, she would not be able to recover damages in English
law because there is no duty of care in relation to negligent misrepre-
sentations extending beyond "special relationships. '' 41 In France,
there is no equivalent principle, but the reader would probably be
denied compensation on the different ground that there is an insuffi-
ciently strong causal link between the negligence and the loss. 42
Law and economics can enrich comparative study of this kind in
two different ways. First, by predicting what consequences would
have occurred if the newspaper had to pay compensation, it can help
in an understanding of why the legal systems might reach the same
outcome.43 Information provided by a newspaper generates some
positive externalities; third parties can benefit without paying. If it is
held liable for negative externalities (losses caused by the advice),
without being compensated for these positive externalities, it will be
unwilling to provide the information. Secondly, we can explore the
cost implications of the two different legal methods of reaching the
outcome (no liability). The English approach is more of a hard and
fast rule, leaving little discretion for its application to marginal cases;
and the greater certainty generates savings in transaction costs and
administrative costs. At the same time, the very rigidity of the rule
may lead to welfare losses where, in a particular case, there are insuf-
ficient positive externalities to justify restricting the internalization of
negative externalities. The greater flexibility inherent in the French
application of a causation test can accommodate some variation in
legal outcome, and thus a saving of these welfare losses, but, because
41. Hedley Byrne & Co. Ltd. v. Heller & Partners Ltd., [1964] A.C. 465, 483, 486 (H.L.
1963).
42. See the decision in S. Jur. II, 217 (Trib. Seine 1931), and comparison of the two legal
systems in D. Marshall, Liability for Pure Economic Loss Negligently Caused-French and
English Law Compared, 24 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 748, 786-87 (1975).
43. William Bishop, Negligent Misrepresentation Through Economists' Eyes, 96 L.Q. REV.
360 (1980).
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of the uncertainty arising from the more general rule, with an increase
of transaction and administrative costs.44
Of course, in some situations the differences between two legal
systems may be real, and not just apparent, in that the outcomes di-
verge. Law and economics can here predict what economic conse-
quences flow from the difference. We can use the example of an
individual who purchases a chattel from someone who does not have
a good title, perhaps because he is a thief. English law, in general,
protects the original owner;45 in France, a bona fide purchaser typi-
cally has better title.46 The following analysis predicts that the French
approach increases the value of the chattel.47
In the case of the purchase of (say) a jewel, the buyer is willing to
pay for it
U-pL-qM
where U represents the value (the utility) of the jewel to her; pL the
losses resulting from the risk of the seller not having good title to
pass; and qM the losses resulting from the risk that, after purchase,
the jewel will be lost or stolen and eventually bought by a third party.
As summarized in the table below, we can expect that in France, pro-
vided it is a bona fide purchase, pL will be trivial; but qM may give
rise to significant losses. The reverse is true under the traditional Eng-
lish approach, where pL will be the significant risk. In these circum-
stances, the purchaser will be motivated to allocate resources to
reduce the risk, and will do so if the cost is less than the benefit, the
reduction in losses engendered by such action. In France, this will be
Co, the cost of the owner taking care to prevent loss or theft; in Eng-
land, it will be C,, the cost to the purchaser of making inquiries into
the title held by the seller.
Principal risk Cheapest risk avoidance method
French law pL owner takes care at cost C.
English law qM purchaser investigates title at cost C,
44. See generally Ehrlich & Posner, supra note 19.
45. Sale of Goods Act, 1979, c. 54, § 21(1) (Eng.). For exceptions, see ROY GOODE,
COMMERCIAL LAW 451-85 (2d ed. 1995).
46. C. Civ., art. 2279 (Fr.), and see ANTHONY OGUS & MICHAEL FAURE, tCONOMIE DU
DRO1T: LE CAS FRANQAIS 56 (2002).
47. See ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 152-54 (1988).
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If the aim is to maximize the value of the jewel to the purchaser
(U-pL-qM), then, assuming that pL is approximately equivalent to
qM,48 we need a law which induces the cheaper of the avoidance
methods, Co or C, This will vary according to the circumstances, but
in most cases intuition suggests that investigating title will be more
expensive than taking care. 49 If that is the case, the jewel will have a
greater value under the French rule than under the English rule.
II. EXPLANATORY LAW AND ECONOMICS
For the second part of this Article, I turn to the alternative form
of positive economic analysis of law, which I consider to be more ap-
propriately designated "explanatory law and economics" and which
explores the hypothesis that the law (or at least common/customary
law) generates allocatively efficient outcomes. I do not wish, here, to
enter into the debate regarding its theoretical basis or its methodo-
logical dimensions, although we should recognize that, for reasons
already given, 0 it is more controversial than that which I have called
positive law and economics. Notwithstanding, or perhaps because of,
this, it has proved to be of great interest to legal scholars.
Why should this be so? In my opinion, it is principally because it
is seen as making a major contribution to the traditional central task
for legal scholarship, promoting coherence and systematic orderliness
in the law. I illustrate the contention with two areas of analysis. In the
first, I seek to demonstrate how an efficiency interpretation can pro-
vide a firmer foundation and less ambiguity than notions of morality
or corrective justice, which are often asserted to be the basis of the
legal rules. In the second, I show how the economic approach pro-
vides a valuable method for classifying and structuring the law. Both
areas of discussion draw on Coasean reasoning.
48. This might not be the case. See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Econom-
ics of Legal Disputes over the Ownership of Works of Art and Other Collectibles, in ECONOMICS
OF THE ARTS: SELECTED ESSAYS 177 (Victor A. Ginsburgh & Pierre-Michel Menger eds., 1996)
(noting that the French rule increases the value of the stolen item to the thief and thus also the
probability of theft and the owner's protection costs).
49. The possibility of insuring against the risk should not affect the analysis, because the
insurance contract and the premium paid should induce taking action to avoid the risk, if that is
cheaper.
50. See supra text accompanying note 11.
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A. Efficiency as a Rationalizing Device51
Many legal entitlements are expressed in language apparently re-
flecting morality or corrective justice (e.g., good faith, proportionality,
reasonableness, fiduciary relationships, unjust enrichment, due proc-
ess), and yet exploration of the principles often reveals a deep ambi-
guity in the normative framework, rendering the law unpredictable
and incoherent. Interpreting the entitlements in the light of allocative
efficiency goals can provide the law with a firmer foundation, albeit
by sacrificing the moral dimension.
A major part of the law, both civil and criminal, is concerned with
attributing consequences to causes and thereby delineating the limits of
responsibility. Within the civil law, the notion of corrective justice is
typically invoked to explain why responsibility is primarily ascribed to
those who inflict harm on others." In the context of liability based on
negligence, most legal systems therefore draw a distinction between
acts (malfeasance) and omissions (nonfeasance) and reveal some cau-
tion in imposing responsibility for the latter. The strength of the re-
luctance to impose positive duties to act nevertheless varies
significantly between different jurisdictions.53 If corrective justice
ideas are the basis of the law, this is not surprising since moral values
are unlikely to be homogenous. So, for example, the traditional com-
mon law, with its emphasis on individual liberty, has a narrower range
of liability for omissions54 than (say) French law, with its more collec-
tivist approach.55 But the question of where to draw the line to accord
with presumed moral values has proved to be problematic.
Take English law which adopts the fundamental principle that a
failure to act as the Good Samaritan and rescue another person is not
actionable. This is qualified by recognizing situations in which there is a
positive duty to prevent harm, notably where there exists some form of
pre-tort relationship between the parties, such as that between employ-
51. This Section draws on my paper, Anthony Ogus, Inglaterra sin Pescado y Patatas Fritas,
o qug mds Deberiamos Haber Descubierto en el Ensayo de Coase Sobre Costos Sociales [Eng-
land Without Fish and Chips, or What More Should We Have Discovered in Coase's Social Cost
Paper?], 3 REVISTA ARGENTINA DE TEORIA JURIDICA (2000), available at
http://www.utdt.edu/departamentos/derecho/publicaciones/rtj 1/pdf/TraduccionOgusfinal.pdf.
52. There are a variety of approaches which can be labeled "corrective justice"; for more
detail on the concept in this context, see TORT LAW (Ernest Joseph Weinrib ed., 1991).
53. Jean Limpens et al., Liability for One's Own Act, in 11 INTERNATIONAL
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW 36-43 (Andr6 Tunc ed., 1979).
54. B.S. Markesinis, Negligence, Nuisance and Affirmative Duties of Action, 105 L.Q. REV.
104 (1989).
55. JEAN CARBONNIER, 4 DROIT CIVIL: LES OBLIGATIONS 392-97 (21st ed. 1998).
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ers and employees, 6 professionals and their clients, 7 or that of adjacent
landowners 8 and the defendant has knowledge adequate to meet the
contingency. But commentators have found it difficult to formulate the
principle of corrective justice on which this distinction is based; it is still
more difficult to prescribe how cases in the gray area outside familiar
categories should be determined: 9
Much clearer guidance on the appropriate liability rule can be
derived from the economic approach. The starting point must be the
notion of reciprocal conflict of resource uses, which lies at the heart of
the Coasean analysis and which suggests that there is no a priori reason
for assuming that the inflictor of harm is "responsible" for any misallo-
cation. Of course, this contrasts strikingly with the traditional legal ap-
proaches.6° As Ackerman has appositely observed, the general value of
the analysis to lawyers is that it "urges a conception of causation that
recognizes how a multiplicity of factors, operating over a lengthy pe-
riod of time, contribute to our legal discontents. '' 61 What then of the
particular problem of omissions? The analysis invites us to reject any
distinction between misfeasance and nonfeasance. Taken to its logical
conclusion, that would seem to lead to the absurdity that any single ac-
cident can be attributed to an infinite number of passive agents, any one
of whom could have prevented it and therefore who could potentially
be made liable. But we do not have to travel so far to arrive at meaning-
ful insights.
We need to inquire how the efficient solution might have been
reached by market transactions. 62 Approaching the problem in this way,
we can see how one party might be willing to provide the level of pre-
caution which meets the preferences of the other party-the potential
victim -at a price which the latter is prepared to pay. There might be an
explicit agreement to deal with the risk, for example if someone is em-
ployed to act as a lifeguard and is paid a fee reflecting the cost to that
individual of providing the level of safety desired by the potential vic-
56. Costello v. Chief Constable of the Northumbria Police, [1999] 1 All ER 550 (C.A.
1998).
57. Carr-Glynn v. Frearsons, [1999] Ch. 326 (C.A. 1998).
58. Goldman v. Hargrave, [1967] 1 A.C. 645 (P.C. 1966).
59. See e.g., Tony Honor6, Are Omissions Less Culpable?, in ESSAYS FOR PATRICK
ATIYAH 31 (Peter Cane & Jane Stapleton eds., 1991).
60. Paul Burrows, A Deferential Role for Efficiency Theory in Analysing Causation-Based
Tort Law, 8 EUR. J.L. & ECON. 29 (1999).
61. BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, RECONSTRUCTING AMERICAN LAW 52 (1984).
62. Judge Posner recently adopted such reasoning in Stockberger v. United States, 332 F.3d
479, 483-84 (7th Cir. 2003).
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tim. But more often it will function within a broader-based contractual
setting. An employer assumes responsibility for positive steps to secure
the health and safety of employees, the cost (in part, at least) being off-
set against wages and other benefits provided.
We can see now why there is a tendency to impose liability for
omissions on the employer and others involved in a pre-tort relationship
with the victim. Even if there was no explicit assumption of the respon-
sibility, the existence of the relationship and the relevant knowledge of
the defendant would suggest this was likely to be the cheapest way of
dealing with the risk. The law performs the useful economic function of
imposing the solution which the parties themselves would rationally
have reached if they had been able to make an appropriate contract.
What then of the Good Samaritan, i.e., the casual bystander? 63 The
person in distress may have the opportunity to make a contract with a
potential rescuer. If the victim had no alternative recourse, the terms of
the agreement should be reviewed to ensure that the rescuer has not
exploited the monopoly situation;64 otherwise the contractual solution is
appropriate. Suppose, however, that a contract is not feasible because,
for example, the victim is unconscious or, to prevent harm, an act of
assistance is necessary before the victim becomes aware of her plight.
Consistent with the reasoning above, we should here expect the law to
imitate the efficient contract that would have been made if it had been
possible. Especially if the assistance could have been effected at low
cost, that would seem to imply imposing a duty to rescue, a solution not
accepted by English law.
Further consideration may nevertheless furnish arguments against
such a duty. We should first note that there may be a technical legal
problem in the rescuer obtaining compensation from the victim for the
cost of rescue.65 If there is little prospect of payment, that will reduce the
supply of potential rescuers not motivated by altruism.66 A second point
is that the duty imposed on the rescuer may reduce the incentive on the
victim to take care. 67 Next, in identifying what, in the circumstances,
63. For a full discussion, see William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, Salvors, Finders,
Good Samaritans, and Other Rescuers: An Economic Study of Law and Altruism, 7 J. LEGAL
STUD. 83 (1978).
64. On the doctrine of economic duress, see Pao On v. Lau Yiu Long, [1980] A.C. 614,
635-36 (P.C. 1979).
65. The doctrine of agency of necessity is relatively limited in English law. See LORD GOFF
& GARETH JONES, THE LAW OF RESTITUTION 461-98 (5th ed. 1998).
66. Landes & Posner, supra note 63, at 119-27.
67. Donald Wittman, Optimal Pricing of Sequential Inputs: Last Clear Chance, Mitigation
of Damages, and Related Doctrines in the Law, 10 J. LEGAL STUD. 65, 89 (1981).
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would have been the efficient contract, we must be careful to adopt a
sufficiently broad perspective of the relevant costs and benefits. In par-
ticular, there is a danger of underestimating the costs of imposing a posi-
tive duty to act. Take, first, the costs to an individual. In general, it is
cheaper for someone already engaged in an activity to take steps to
constrain risks arising from it than for a passive agent to respond to a
risk created by another. This is because the active agent has already
selected that activity which presumptively generates for herself the
greatest utility: the added cost of taking care in that activity might be
relatively small. In contrast, the passive agent, to engage in the risk-
controlling activity, must sacrifice all other profitable activities-in
short, her opportunity costs may be considerable. Secondly, in a situa-
tion where any one of a number of individuals could have controlled the
risk, account must be taken of the nontrivial psychic costs which would
be incurred by all those subject to a legal duty to act and, in aggregate,
such costs might be relatively large. 68
I have explored the issue of negligent omissions at some length
because it is necessary to show that it is not easy to formulate an ap-
propriate liability rule. Some caution in relation to omissions liability
is justifiable because the costs of requiring passive agents to engage in
a particular activity may be significantly high. But there are also cases
where the cost of intervention to a particular passive agent would be
small relative even to active agents. By identifying situations in which
the parties would, if transaction costs had not inhibited them, rea-
sonably have entered into a transaction to deal with a given risk, the
analysis lends coherence to the determination of the liability issue.
B. Classifying and Structuring the Law
As I indicated earlier, a major function of legal scholarship is to
ensure the coherence of the law. This has particular importance for
common law systems which, unlike the codified civil law systems,
have evolved without formally structuring legal principles in any
meaningful way other than through the antiquated and arbitrary writ
system. Formal structure may appear to be largely a technical matter,
but it is not. Take the following simple, but also fundamental ques-
tion: an individual sustains a loss as a consequence of an event which
constitutes both a tort and a breach of contract. Supposing that the
principles governing liability differ between the two regimes, which is
68. Liability here also creates problems of distributional justice: the "why me?" objection.
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
to prevail? It is (to me) amazing that common law systems find it dif-
ficult to give a clear answer to that question.69 Civil law systems, or at
least some of them, may do better than this, but they also seem ill
equipped to handle analogous questions, for example whether a prin-
ciple of corporate law is mandatory, or rather may be varied, and thus
is, in effect, a default rule. A schema for structuring the law in a valu-
able way, and thereby meaningfully addressing questions like these,
can be derived from what is explicit or implicit in the foundational
law and economics papers of Coase, Calabresi, and Melamed.
If we proceed with the assumptions of individual autonomy and
utility maximization, we must accept, with Coase, 0 the primacy of
transactions (contracts) over torts in dealing with assets (property),
except where those transactions are the result of significant informa-
tional asymmetry or give rise to externalities which because of trans-
action costs cannot be internalized. 71 Torts, along with implied terms
in contracts, in addition to dealing with these instances of market fail-
ure, may of course operate to reduce the transaction costs of contract-
ing, but in this capacity they are modifiable and thus operate as
default rules. Then, as regards corporate law, adopting the perspec-
tive of Coase's 1937 paper, 72 we can view the firm as a nexus of con-
tracts, individuals seeking to advance their welfare through
transactions with others. The analytical framework (individual auton-
omy subject to qualifications of market failure) can then lead us to a
classification of the principles of corporate law into default and man-
datory rules, acquiring thereby a better understanding of the key is-
sues in legal development. 73
As the author of a book on regulation,74 I know only too well the
problems of classifying that subject. And again it is not simply the
trivial issue of the library shelf on which the book should be placed.
The economic framework for classification 75 facilitates clear thinking
in relation to two key steps in policy debates concerning regulation:
69. Tony Weir, Complex Liabilities, in 11 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
COMPARATIVE LAW ch. 12 (Andr6 Tunc ed., 1983).
70. Coase, supra note 27.
71. Thus justifying the French principle of non-cumul of contractual and delictual liability,
and derogations from it. OGUS & FAURE, supra note 46, at 103-04.
72. R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937).
73. BRIAN R. CHEFFINS, COMPANY LAW: THEORY, STRUCTURE, AND OPERATION (1997).
74. ANTHONY OGUS, REGULATION: LEGAL FORM AND ECONOMIC THEORY (1994).
75. Ironically, clarification is not provided by economists themselves. Because they are
often unaware of the key distinction between private and public law, they sometimes treat
"regulation" as synonymous with law in general.
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Why regulate? And what regulatory/legal form is appropriate? As
regards the first of these, and pursuing the logic of Coasean analysis,
it suggests that we inquire into whether the administrative and trans-
action costs associated with a regulatory response to market failure
are lower or higher than the private law response.76 In relation to the
second question, the same cost inquiry can be applied to different
regulatory forms; for example, licenses, standards, information disclo-
sure, or financial instruments.77
The analytical framework used by Calabresi and Melamed in
their famous 1972 paper 78 has proved to be equally important. Their
distinction between liability rules and property rules cuts across tradi-
tional legal categories but provides an essential tool for understand-
ing the different ways in which the law protects entitlements, and for
recognizing the cost implications on choices between them. The iden-
tification of inalienable rights extends the framework beyond eco-
nomic methodology but enables us to accommodate criminal law
within the Coasean-inspired schema by explaining why certain assets
are taken outside the scope of transactional dealings.79
CONCLUSION
In this Article I have sought to show that legal scholars have
(still) much to learn from law and economics. I have focused on the
positive and interpretative function of the subdiscipline, rather than
its (perhaps overexposed) normative dimension. And I have chosen
to concentrate on some basic themes: the use of different legal forms
as behavioral incentives; the ex ante/ex post dilemma of legal adjudi-
cation; rule formulation from a comparative perspective; efficiency as
a rationalizing device for determining entitlements; and legal classifi-
cations. The analysis used in the examples I discuss will be familiar,
but it is intended to highlight key features in law and economics rea-
soning which lawyers tend to ignore.
76. OGUS, supra note 74, at 25-28; see, e.g., Steven Shavell, Liability for Harm Versus
Regulation of Safety, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 357 (1984).
77. OGUS, supra note 74, at 150-60; see, e.g., Steven Shavell, The Optimal Structure of Law
Enforcement, 36 J.L. & ECON. 255 (1993).
78. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 28.
79. For economic rationalizations of the criminal law generally, see Alvin K. Klevorick,
Crime as a Distinct Category of Behaviour, in 1 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF
ECONOMICS AND THE LAW, supra note 2, at 542-46.

